Orestis Telelis, Assistant Professor

Orestis Telelis obtained his degree from the Department of Informatics and Telecommunications of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, in 2001. He received his M.Sc. Diploma in Advanced Information Systems (2003) and his Ph.D. in Theoretical Computer Science (2006), from the same department. He worked as a post-doctoral researcher in the Evry-Val d’Essonne University (France, 2007) and in Aarhus University (Denmark, 2007-2009). During the period 2009-2010 he received the “Allain Bensoussan” fellowship from the European Research Consortium for Informatics and Mathematics (ERCIM), for post-doctoral research at the Center for Mathematics and Computer Science (CWI Amsterdam) of the Netherlands. Subsequently, he worked as Research Associate in the Department of Computer Science of the University of Liverpool (United Kingdom, 2010-2012). In the period 2012-2014, he received funding from the General Secretariat of Research and Technology (Greece), for scientific research at the Athens University of Economics and Business. His research interests lie broadly within the fields of Algorithms Design and Analysis and of Computational Complexity. His recent work is on Algorithmic Game Theory (Mechanism Design, Computation and Efficiency of Equilibria, Auctions and Pricing Algorithms) and on Approximation Algorithms for computationally hard problems.

Undergraduate Degree Program

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Publications 2013 – 2017


I) JOURNALS

  • E. Markakis, O. Telelis: Item Bidding for Combinatorial Public Projects. Theoretical Computer Science 678: 40-55 (2017)
  • P. Krysta, O. Telelis, C. Ventre: Mechanisms for Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions with a Few Distinct Goods. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR) 53: 721-744 (2015).
  • B. de Keijzer, G. Schaefer, O. Telelis: The Strong Price of Anarchy of Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games. Theory of Computing Systems 57(2): 377-396 (2015).
  • E. Markakis, O. Telelis. Uniform Price Auctions: Equilibria and Efficiency. Theory of Computing Systems 57(3): 549-575 (2015).


II) CONFERENCES

  • G. Birmpas, E. Markakis, O. Telelis, A. Tsikiridis: Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction. Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) Springer LNCS 10504: 16-28, 2017 (Best Paper Award).
  • E. Markakis, O. Telelis: Envy-Free Revenue Approximation for Asymmetric Buyers with Budgets. Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), Springer LNCS 9928: 247-259, 2016.
  • E. Markakis, O. Telelis: Item Pricing for Combinatorial Public Projects. Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Algorithmic Aspects of Information and Management (AAIM), Springer LNCS 9778: 1-13, 2016.
  • P. Krysta, O. Telelis, C. Ventre: Near-Optimal Approximation Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions. Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 2015: 4275-4281.
  • M. Karaliopoulos, O. Telelis, I. Koutsopoulos: User Recruitment for Mobile Crowdsensing over Opportunistic Networks. Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM 2015: 2254-2262.
  • E. Markakis, O. Telelis. Item Bidding for Combinatorial Public Projects. Proceedings of the 28th Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2014:749–755, AAAI Press.
  • B. de Keijzer, E. Markakis, G. Schaefer, O. Telelis. Inefficiency of Standard Multi-Unit Auctions. Proceedings of the 21st European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA), Springer LNCS 8125: 385–396, 2013.
  • P. Krysta, O. Telelis, C. Ventre. Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions with a Few Distinct Goods. Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), 2013: 691–698 (Best Paper Award).